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NOTE
Disease Prevention and the Genetic
Revolution: Defining a Parental Right
to Protect the Bodily Integrity of
Future Children
By MEGAN ANNE JELLINEK*
FREEDOM
Day turned softly to night and the night almost to day,
And in those dusky hours, while Life clenched her hand,
She left our Earth as quietly as that day began.
And She freed herself as She left anguished tears behind,
And the earthly hearts ached and broke with loss
And with the wonder that Love came at such punishing cost.
Good-bye to the world that held Her back.
Good-bye to the body forever a foe.
Good-bye to the suffering that no child should ever know.
Megan Anne Jellinek
I. Introduction: Parents and Purpose
Recent advances in genetic and reproductive technology broaden
the capacity of parents to make crucial life decisions for their chil-
dren.' Growing support for the Human Genome Initiative,2 as well as
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2000. B.A., University
of Washington, 1996. For you, Gretchen. And for your Freedom. And for the rest of my
family and friends who have always known and respected where I stand on this issue. My
deepest appreciation to my daily inspirations: my Mom and my sister, Lindsey. Special
thanks to Professor Lois Weithom for listening to my initial idea and to Dean Nell Newton
for giving me both my interest in constitutional law and the opportunity to contribute this
piece to the Quarterly.
1. See Renee C. Esfandiary, Note, The Changing World of Genetics and Abortion:
Why the Women's Movement Should Advocate for Limitations on the Right to Choose in the
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society's burgeoning genetic consciousness, 3 press parents to consider
the role of genetic intervention in the procreation of their children.4
For parents whose children will inevitably develop severe disabilities5
or terminal illnesses,6 parental decision making at the embryonic
stage7 of reproduction can profoundly affect the health, well-being,
and quality of life of their future children. The use of technology8 to
Area of Genetic Technology, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 499, 499 (1998) (discussing
the general scope of genetic and reproductive technology).
2. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA MERRICK, HuMAN REPRODUCrnoN, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICrING RIGHTS 145 (1995) (defining the Human Genome Initi-
ative as "an international research effort whose goal is to analyze the basic genetic struc-
ture of human DNA and to determine the location of the estimated 100,000 human
genes.").
3. See John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L.
Rnv. 421, 421 (1996) (defining genetic consciousness as "the awareness of the role of genes
in human affairs" and recognizing that genetic consciousness "plays an increasingly impor-
tant role in daily life.").
4. See Vicki G. Norton, Note, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation
Genetic Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1581, 1601-02 (discussing
social pressure to "have highly intelligent, artistically talented, or athletically gifted
children.").
5. This Note deals with the highly controversial topic of allowing parents to choose
against bearing children who, at the embryonic stage of development, have been deter-
mined to carry genes that will manifest in severe disability or terminal illness. The question
then becomes: what is a "severe disability" and does the genetic selection discussed in this
paper discriminate against already born disabled persons? For the purposes of this Note, I
define severe disability, as any disease, mutation, or disorder, neurological or otherwise,
that causes the prolonged pain and suffering of the affected individual and/or causes the
permanent vegetative state of the affected individual. For a discussion of the discrimina-
tion issues, see discussion infra Part VI.
6. For the purposes of this Note, I only address terminal illnesses that manifest at
birth or during early childhood. I define terminal illness as those diseases or progressive
debilities that cause inevitable, premature death.
7. Although genetic screening is currently used for in utero testing, this Note deals
specifically with in vitro screening. In vitro fertilization is defined as when "an individual
sperm is injected directly into a woman's egg in a laboratory petri dish." Esfandiary, supra
note 2, at 506 (outlining the in vitro fertilization process).
8. This Note considers the constitutional basis for regulating two distinct types of
genetic intervention: intervention for disease prevention and intervention for cosmetic se-
lection. Already, geneticists have developed the means to screen embryos for hereditary
disease. The procedure screens in vitro embryos for disease and, then, selectively transfers
only the healthy embryos to the mother's uterus. The process, therefore, ensures the birth
of healthy offspring or, at least, the birth of offspring free from specific disease. See
Healthy Baby Is Born After Test For Deadly Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at A7. Un-
like embryonic disease prevention, intervention for cosmetic selection is a creature of the
future. The possibility of using non-transfer procedures to select offspring with certain
aesthetic attributes or character traits, however, looms on the horizon. See Robertson,
supra note 4, at 422.
GENETIC REVOLUTION
eradicate disease and suffering from potential offspring,9 however,
places today's parents at a controversial crossroads. 10
Although advances in genetic technology offer parents an effec-
tive and compassionate way to prevent the future suffering of their
children," the genome project 2 also creates the possibility of parental
selection for a wide range of other, exceedingly superficial offspring
characteristics. 3 Unfortunately, current legal debate regarding ge-
netic intervention lumps the two types of selection into one controver-
sial category. 4 By equating disease prevention with cosmetic
selection,15 social commentators trivialize the important decisions that
some parents must make to protect the health of their children.'6 The
9. This Note deals specifically with preimplantation screening of "potential off-
spring." Preimplantation screening is the "evaluation of preembryos for disease or birth
defect." June Coleman, Note, Playing God or Playing Scientist A Constitutional Analysis
of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331, 1354 (1996). See also
Norton, supra note 5, at 1592-97 (discussing the intricacies of the preimplantation screen-
ing process).
10. See also Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future,
7 HASTrNGs CTR. REP. 1, 11-12 (1997) (discussing that "it is precisely where children are
concerned that [parents] are understandably most jealous of their prerogatives to guide
and make decisions").
11. Some states define "genetic screening" in specific, non-cosmetic language. See
Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 3901.49 (West 1999) ("'Genetic screening or testing' means a
laboratory test... for abnormalities, defects, or deficiencies, including carrier status, that
are linked to physical or mental disorders or impairments, or that indicate a susceptibility
to illness, disease, or other disorders,'whether physical or mental, which test is a direct test
for abnormalities, defects, or deficiencies, and not an indirect manifestation of genetic
disorders.").
12. See explanation supra note 3. See also Jeffrey M. Weinberg, Breaking Bonds: Dis-
crimination in the Genetic Revolution, JAMA, Oct. 7, 1992, at 1767 ("Experiments on gene
therapy have begun, as has an initiative to map and sequence the 3 billion bases of the
human genome, a project funded at approximately $3 billion over 15 years in the United
States alone.").
13. See Marilyn Moysa, Critics Fear Embryo Testing Could Be Abused, OTrAWA Crm-
zEN, Nov. 29, 1993, at A4 (discussing the possibility of genetic selection for a wide range of
physical and mental characteristics).
14. See generally Robertson, supra note 3, at 429-40 (arguing that procreative liberty
encompasses all decisions regarding embryonic screening).
15. For the purposes of this Note, "cosmetic selection" refers to the use of genetic
technology to select or enhance the physical characteristics -such as eye color and
weight-of potential offspring. This paper also broadly defines "cosmetic selection" as
genetic selection for mental traits, including intelligence and personality.
16. Equating disease prevention and cosmetic selection trivializes the parental deci-
sion to forego implantation of disease-affected embryos. Parents who make the decision to
prevent the suffering of their future children do not use genetic technology to prevent the
births of cosmetically undesirable children.
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confusion degrades the significance of parental decision making,17 as
well as undermines the parameters of established reproductive rights.
In light of rapidly advancing technology,"8 solid frameworks must
be established to deal with the inevitable concerns-both legal' 9 and
ethical2 -of a reproductive world teeming with genetic possibilities.2 '
This Note proposes a starting point2 2 for protecting the genetic inter-
ests of both parents and children. First, by examining current consti-
tutional bases for disease screening, this Note determines that the
protections articulated in the landmark reproductive rights cases13 are
problematic when applied to genetic intervention. Although these
precedents both reinforce invaluable fundamental rights and serve as
a basic foundation for parental autonomy, the named rights do not
explicitly safeguard the special needs of "at risk" parents.24 By tracing
the role of parental decision making in various contexts of children's
end-of-life care,' this Note demonstrates the existence of an unspo-
ken, but customarily accepted, deference to parental autonomy in de-
ciding appropriate life and death decisions for children. This
deference, so rooted in American tradition and so thoroughly estab-
17. See Norton, supra note 4, at 1610 (discussing the possibility that "the use of
[Preimplantation Genetic Screening] to screen for nontherapeutic traits may cause a back-
lash against those using it for less morally troubling purposes, such as preventing serious
and untreatable genetic disease.").
18. See Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 504 (discussing the "impossibility" of slowing the
advances of genetic technology).
19. See iL at 507 (discussing the divisive nature of genetic screening in the legislative
and judicial contexts).
20. See Aileen Ballantyne, Small but Perfectly Formed, LONDON TmEs, Oct. 24, 1992,
at 7 (discussing ethical concerns of genetic screening, including discrimination against fami-
lies who choose to bear disabled children). See also Weinberg, supra note 12, at 1767 ("Ge-
netic information has had broad repercussions on our social structure. Several institutions,
such as the insurance and education industries, government, and employers, all have an
interest in advocating large-scale genetic disease screening.").
21. See Norton, supra note 4, at 1582-84 (discussing the use of current technology to
successfully screen out disease in otherwise affected embryos and the potential use of such
technology for discriminatory purposes).
22. The issues discussed in this Note indicate that a larger debate will develop as ge-
netic technology advances. This Note recognizes that legislation and regulation will inevi-
tably follow the growing debate surrounding genetic intervention.
23. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
24. In the narrow sense, "at risk" parents are those parents whose families have a
history of genetic disease. In a broader sense, "at risk" parents are all parents, as mutation
and genetic disorder do not selectively operate on the embryos of parents who have known
family histories of genetic disease.
25. For the purposes of this Note, I define decisions regarding children's end-of-life
care as parental decisions to either sustain or terminate life for their dying children, includ-
ing embryos and fetuses.
lished in judicial opinion, confirms the existence of a fundamental
right of parents to protect the bodily dignity of their potential
offspring.26
Second, this Note argues that the possible use of genetic screen-
ing to preselect the cosmetic features27 of children trivializes, and even
endangers, the right of parents to prevent serious and debilitating dis-
ease in their children. By analyzing genetic intervention under the
suggested "parental autonomy" framework, this Note demonstrates
that cosmetic intervention-unlike disease prevention-is not guaran-
teed constitutional protection. As the State steps in to regulate ge-
netic engineering,' the distinction between cosmetic selection and
disease prevention takes on profound meaning.29 Considering a possi-
ble moratorium 30 on genetic intervention, a fundamental parental au-
tonomy right will provide parents with the means to continue disease
prevention techniques and to, subsequently, protect their future chil-
dren from prolonged suffering.
Third, this Note addresses the criticism that genetically intrusive
disease prevention inherently discriminates against disabled people.
By differentiating between compassionate intervention at the embry-
onic level and unacceptable discrimination against already-born dis-
abled persons, this paper refutes the idea that genetic screening
devalues the lives of the disabled.
Interwoven in every argument, this Note addresses the balance of
rights between parents, children, and the State. This Note assumes
that parents, almost invariably, act in the "best interest" of their chil-
dren.31 The presumption is a powerful one, based in natural law, as
well as in the dictates of legislative enactment and judicial interpreta-
tion. Applying this assumption to genetic intervention, however,
raises complicated questions of whether parents are capable of decid-
26. See Davis, supra note 10, at 1 (discussing the "respect for patient autonomy" inher-
ent in genetic counseling and decision making).
27. See supra note 15 (defining cosmetic selection).
28. See Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 501 ("Genetic engineering refers to specific 'tech-
niques by which scientists can add genetically determined characteristics to cells that would
not otherwise have possessed them."').
29. In light of inevitable regulation of genetic technology, differentiation between dis-
ease prevention and cosmetic selection is imperative for the continuation of disease screen-
ing. See discussion infra Part V.
30. The controversial nature of genetic selection raises moral concerns akin to those
regarding human cloning. In California, ethical concerns influenced a five year morato-
rium on all human cloning. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2260.5 (Deering 2000). This paper
addresses the possibility of a similar ban on genetic intervention.
31. See discussion infra Part II.
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ing the "best interests" of unborn children. This Note argues that par-
ents have a fundamental right to protect the health and bodily
integrity of their children by making crucial decisions at all stages of
human development.
In sum, this Note focuses on the unique life and death decisions
that some parents must make for their children." By advocating the
use of genetic technology to "screen out" disabling disease, this paper
highlights the emotional and physical advantages of parental decision
making at the earliest stages of procreation. More specifically, this
Note attempts to secure parental discretion in genetic decision making
by identifying a fundamental right of parents to protect the bodily in-
tegrity of their children, even if that protection arises in the context of
decision making at the embryonic stage. By reconceptualizing the ex-
isting sources of such a right,3 this Note demonstrates that the paren-
tal right to secure children against bodily indignity allows parents to
choose non-life, over disabled life, for their future children. The un-
derlying theory of this Note will provoke criticism from both con-
servative and feminist points of view; 4 nonetheless, the controversial
ideas presented in this Note effectively demonstrate the inadequacy of
the present system in protecting both the fundamental rights of par-
ents and the bodily integrity of their children. 5
H. A Brief Word: Examining the Desire for
Disease Prevention
Every night & every Morn
Some to Misery are Born.
Every Morn & every Night
Some are Born to sweet delight.
36
If the proposed parental autonomy right did exist, not all parents
would choose to make use of the correlating disease prevention tech-
32. Parental decisions regarding the premature death of children are "unique" in that
most parents assume that they will outlive their children.
33. This Note assumes that a right of parental decision to protect the bodily integrity
of future children already exists. The right simply needs clarification. See discussion infra
Part IV.
34. See discussion infra Part VII.
35. The present system of protecting parental rights in the genetic screening context
relies on constitutional rights that do not include modem technology. The constitutional
right of parents to protect the bodily integrity of future children needs to be more clearly
articulated. See discussion infra Part IV.
36. William Blake, Auguries of Innocence, in PmLLIP KrcHER, Tim LrvEs To COME,
front page (1996).
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nology.37 This Note in no way suggests that such important-and fun-
damental-decision making should be removed from parental control.
Quite to the contrary, this Note supports the use of preventative inter-
vention for only those parents who feel that non-life is in the best
interest of their potential children.38 The parental autonomy right
protects parental discretion, regardless of whether parents choose to
sustain or terminate3 9 the lives of their suffering children.4 °
Parents who choose to bear, raise, and love severely disabled chil-
dren must be commended for their strength, as the task is a formida-
ble one.4' It must be noted, however, that not all parents feel that
giving life to a severely disabled child is in the best interest of that
child. For these parents, the thought of beginning or continuing life
for a child whose existence consists entirely of pain, unconsciousness,
or both, constitutes unnecessary cruelty.42 In these circumstances,
parents love and respect their potential children no less than those
parents who choose to give life to affected children.43
Although the United States legal system assumes that "natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children," 44 no one static definition of "best interests" exists. In the
realm of preventative intervention, the power of a dynamic "best in-
37. See Earl Lane, Caution Urged in Gene Testing, NEWSDAY, Nov. 5, 1993, at 17 (dis-
cussing a report by the Institute of Medicine, supporting a parental right to have a child
with a genetic disease).
38. For a discussion of the parental right to bear children with severe disabilities, see
Lois Sheperd, Protecting Parents' Freedom to Have Children with Genetic Differences, 1995
U. ILL. L. REv. 761 (1995).
39. For the purposes of this Note, "termination" of life includes discarding diseased
embryos, aborting a fetus, and deciding to end life support for critically ill newborns and
terminally ill minor children. This Note also recognizes the broad discretion of women to
decide the "best interests" of their fetuses, whether that means aborting a healthy fetus or
carrying a disabled fetus to term.
40. See Moysa, supra note 13, at A4 (quoting a lawyer for the Canadian Disability
Rights Council: "The real meaning of the word choice ... includes the option of having a
disabled child.").
41. See infra note 103.
42. See Moysa, supra note 13, at A4 (quoting a Canadian reproductive specialist: "All
you have to do is talk to these people to know what I mean.... Anyone who has to think
about giving birth to a child and then watching them gradually die over five years, I mean,
it's horrible.").
43. See Arthur L. Caplan, Hard Cases Make Bad Law: The Legacy of the Baby Doe
Controversy, in COMPELLED COMPASSION 121 (Arthur Caplan et al. eds., 1992) ("Public
policy must presume that parents love their children, seek what is best for them, and act
accordingly. The burden should be on others, be they providers or government officials, to
show that these presumptions are false.").
44. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925)) (citations omitted).
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terests" standard is paramount. The proposed right of parents to de-
cide the best interests of their children, at any stage in their children's
lives, recognizes and supports the divergent outcomes inherent in pa-
rental decision making.4 5 As each set of parents separately under-
stands the ramifications of giving life to a severely disabled child,46
each set of parents should have the discretion to decide whether life is
indeed in the best interest of their potential child.47
In arguing for the establishment of just such discretion, this Note
recognizes the further tragedy that would befall parents if the State
imposed one "best interests" standard on all parents. In light of the
severe infringement on fundamental rights, the possibility of the State
mandating the destruction of all diseased embryos appears slim.48 A
blanket ban on genetic intervention, 49 however, is a legitimate con-
cern and would increase the level of desperation exerted on parents
who, because of the lack of adequate safeguards,50 bear unhealthy
children. In some cases, parents may resort to extreme measures to
eliminate their children's suffering and to protect what they feel is the
best interest of their children.5 Additionally, parents who would
45. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (stating that "it is clear
that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government in-
terference are personal decisions 'relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education."') (internal citations omitted).
46. See Ballantyne, supra note 20, at 2 (discussing the benefit of genetic screening for
parents "choosing to have a handicapped child .... Such parents are able to prepare
themselves and do everything possible, from birth, for that child.").
47. See Lois A. Weithorn & Mary Ann McCabe, Emerging Ethical Issues in Pediatric
Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF PEDIATRIC PsYCHOLOGY 577 (Donald K. Routh ed., 1988)
("A child is born into a family that, on some continuum, is able or motivated, or unable or
unmotivated, to care for [a disabled] infant. Although it is not clear how family actors
should be weighed, the reality is that the capacity of family members to provide for the
child's emotional, physical, and financial needs does affect the child's future well-being.")
(emphasis in original).
48. See supra note 46. See discussion infra note 63 and accompanying text.
49. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 1398 (stating that "[w]hile total bans may be uncon-
stitutional, the state concerns that prompted regulation are valid and provide further impe-
tus to enact national guidelines for embryological research."). This Note recognizes the
need for government regulation in the genetic arena; however, such regulation cannot in-
fringe on the constitutional right of parents to decide the best interests of their future
children. See discussion in text supra Part II.
50. If both disease screening at the embryonic stage and late-term abortion are prohib-
ited, women who become pregnant and discover late in pregnancy that their fetus is se-
verely disabled will be forced to bear critically ill, suffering children. For a discussion on
women's reliance on abortion as a safeguard against bearing critically ill children, see
David A. Grimes, The Continuing Need for Late Abortions, iAMA, Aug. 26, 1998, at 747.
51. See generally Griffith v. Florida, 548 So. 2d 244,245 (Fla. App. 1989) (father shoots
three-year-old [Persistent Vegetative State] daughter in her hospital bed because "I didn't
want her to suffer anymore.").
have chosen non-life for their disabled children may feel the double-
bind of a society that first forces them to bear special needs children
and then abandons52 the parents and children to face physical and
emotional hardship53 in isolation.54 The devastating effects of a possi-
ble moratorium on genetic intervention inspires this Note to articulate
a compassionate and constitutionally sound means of protecting the
best interests of parents and children alike.
I. Reproductive Rights: The Wrong Direction for
Disease Prevention
[T]he freedom to bear and beget children if one chooses... is an impor-
tant freedom that is widely accepted as a basic, human right. But its
various components and dimensions have never been fully analyzed, as
technologies of conception and selection now force us to do.55
The majority of Americans take procreative freedom for granted.
Although reproductive rights mark the foundation of family and the
basis for bodily autonomy, many people fail to consider the actual ex-
tent of procreative liberty.56 As the genetic revolution gains momen-
tum, the boundaries of reproductive freedom will be questioned. The
limitations on exactly how and for what reasons parents are able to
reproduce will need to be definitively articulated.57
In the case of genetic intervention, clearly defined rights are cru-
cial to the protection of parental decision making. Regrettably, most
advocates of genetic intervention rely solely on existing reproductive
52. See SSI Families Say They Are Too Frightened and Intimidated to Challenge Fund-
ing Cutoffs for Disabled Children, 25 WTR. HUM. Rrs. 22 (1998) (discussing disabled chil-
dren's increased ineligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under welfare
reform's stringent new guidelines). As of late 1998, more than 138,000 children have been
terminated from SSI benefits. See id at 23.
53. Fimancial hardship can also be a legitimate problem for families with limited eco-
nomic resources, see Elizabeth J. Jameson & Stephen C. King, The Failure of the Federal
Government to Care for Disabled Children: A Critical Analysis of the Supplemental Security
Income Program, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 309, 310-13 (1989).
54. See Weithorn & McCabe, supra note 47, at 577 ("It is our opinion that governmen-
tal policies that require vigorous life-saving efforts with handicapped infants must be ac-
companied by consistent and generous programs offering health, educational, and other
supportive benefits to the children and their families throughout the individuals life
span.").
55. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw REPRO-
DUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 30 (1994).
56. See SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMEr- ORGANIZATION AND
AcrrvIsM IN Tr= ABORTION CoNFLiCr 150-55 (1991) (discussing the dilemma of pro-
choice activists in mobilizing political support, especially in times when reproductive rights
appear relatively secure).
57. See discussion supra Part II.
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rights doctrine 58 to justify the use of embryonic screening. By broadly
construing procreative liberty, these commentators create vast um-
brellas under which just about any procreative technique-however
objectionable-will find protection. This approach is highly problem-
atic. Not only do these loose constructions of liberty undermine the
foundations of established doctrine, but they also fail to address the
novelty of genetic technology. Furthermore, vast interpretations of
procreative freedom will likely provoke fear-based restrictions on ge-
netic intervention, thereby limiting or even destroying access to dis-
ease prevention techniques. Exclusive reliance on sweeping
reproductive rights ideologies, therefore, fails to adequately protect
the parental interest in bearing healthy children. Although procrea-
tive liberty cannot stand alone as the basis for a parental right to inter-
vene in the genetics of future children, the established reproductive
rights are an essential foundation for the construction of more defini-
tive parental autonomy rights.
Long before the landmark reproductive rights cases of the late
1960's and early 1970's, 59 the United States Supreme Court began to
lay the foundation for recognizing procreative liberty. In 1942, by re-
fusing to allow mandatory sterilization as a form of criminal punish-
ment, the Court established that "procreation [is] fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race."6 Although the Court sug-
gested a human interest in protecting reproductive capacity, the opin-
ion failed to explicitly acknowledge a fundamental right to procreate.
The Court's vague consideration of reproductive liberty premised an
ongoing trend in judicial opinion: the failure to articulate procreative
freedom as an absolute right.6
As the landmark reproductive rights cases reveal, reproduction is
a "negative right against public or private interference, not a positive
right to the services or the resources needed to reproduce."'62 The
limited scope of procreative liberty,63 therefore, does little to protect
58. See discussion infra Part III.
59. See supra note 22.
60. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
61. See ROBERTSON, supra note 55, at 23. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (holding that the State retains the right to limit access to abortion); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reconfirming the State's right to intervene in
abortion decisions).
62. ROBERTSON, supra note 55, at 29.
63. But see Norton, supra note 4, at 1620-21 (arguing that "the [Supreme] Court's
holdings which recognize a right to not procreate would almost certainly extend to an af-
firmative right to procreate.") (emphasis in original).
parental discretion in embryonic decision making."4 The established
reproductive rights, however, are essential to protecting choice in the
abortion context. By bringing controversial notions of genetic tech-
nology under traditional reproductive rights protections, the some-
what tenuous abortion rights65 are misconstrued and, subsequently,
degraded.
Premised on the bodily autonomy of women, the fundamental
right to "bear or beget" children is rather limited.66 In the narrow
sense, procreative liberty safeguards women's choices in deciding the
direction of their reproductive lives.67 Although the right to abortion
is not absolute, until the State deems the interests of the unborn child
to outweigh those of the mother,68 women can terminate a pregnancy
for any reason.69 The allure of such broad discretion is understanda-
bly great for proponents of genetic technology;70 however, the incom-
patibility of abortion doctrine and genetic intervention is infinitely
significant.
Speculation regarding the Supreme Court Justices' intentions in
the contraception and abortion cases7" sheds light on the major flaws
of the reproductive rights-genetic intervention analysis. When the
cases were decided, the potential of genetic technology did not exist.
Given the wide variation in genetic possibilities, contemporary com-
mentators cannot accurately assume that the Justices intended to draw
vast future technologies under the protective wings of reproductive
64. But see Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 507 (discussing a woman's right to not
reproduce and the subsequent "right to information relevant to that decision.").
65. Although recent Supreme Court cases have upheld a woman's right to abortion,
the Court's decisions have moved from a rule based right toward a standard based right,
giving states and courts more discretion in restricting abortion access. For example, in
Casey, see supra note 45, the Court moved from trimester regulation to an undue burden
standard, allowing more flexibility in the ways abortion can be restricted. The switch to an
undue burden standard increased the role of the State in women's reproductive decisions,
while simultaneously diminishing the fundamental rights of women.
66. See id.
67. Even if procreative liberty is viewed more broadly, the "right to 'bear or beget'
does not necessarily include the right to bear or beget a beautiful or talented child." Nor-
ton, supra note 4, at 1629.
68. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 1374-77 (1998) (discussing the moral status of the
human embryo).
69. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Norton, supra note 4, at
1621-22, 1627 (analogizing a woman's decision to use preimplantation genetic screening to
a woman's constitutionally protected interest in having a pre-viability abortion, arguing
that a woman's interest in abortion is not seen "as the 'liberty to choose nontherapeutic
abortion,' but rather as the 'liberty to choose abortion."') (internal citations omitted).
70. See Sheperd, supra note 38, at 766-67 (discussing the broad "popular appeal" of
extending bodily autonomy rights to include reproductive rights).
71. See supra notes 23 & 45.
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freedom. Quite to the contrary, the Justices specifically protected the
privacy interests of women to decide-up until a certain point-the
course of their procreative lives. 72 Grounded in the social ideology of
the times,73 the holdings protected women's bodily autonomy and spe-
cifically denounced the pre-viability interests of the unborn.74 The
distinction is essential to demonstrating why reproductive rights
clearly cannot be the sole basis for safeguarding genetic intervention.
In stark contrast to the rationale of the abortion decisions, an un-
derlying tenet of the genetic revolution is that advancing technology
will improve the quality of life for future children.75 The divergent
purposes of abortion protection and genetic intervention, therefore,
cannot be reconciled. 76 The conflict of purpose expels genetic tech-
nology from the safeguards of established reproductive rights doc-
trine. By thrusting genetic technology into the guarded arena of
procreative liberty, the flagrant clash of purpose attracts unnecessary
scrutiny of existing reproductive rights.77 Considering the encroach-
ing restrictions on reproductive liberty,78 the result of increased scru-
tiny regarding fetal interests79 could be devastating to women's
72. See also Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 514 (discussing women's right to pre-viability
abortions when prenatal tests determine serious or congenital fetal disorders).
73. See BLANK & MERICK, supra note 2, at 226 ("Technological change can progress
without restriction, but only if there is a positive social climate. Just as the climate of the
1960s was ripe for the contraceptive revolution, that of the 1980s was receptive to techno-
logical change.").
74. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
75. See discussion infra Part IV, D.
76. See also Norton, supra note 4, at 1619 (discussing an alternative approach to differ-
entiating disease prevention and cosmetic selection: "care must be taken to distinguish
therapeutic procedures which benefit the health of the mother or child from nontherapeu-
tic or experimental procedures which do not benefit the health of the mother or child.").
77. See Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 518-19 (discussing the need to protect women's
genetic choices beyond the judicial branch's tremendous accomplishment in protecting re-
productive choices).
78. Encroaching restrictions on women's procreative liberty include bans on late-term
abortion, as well as child abuse prosecutions for expectant mothers who ingest narcotics.
In both instances, the State weighs the rights of the fetus over the rights of the potential
mother. See "Banning Late-term Abortions: Bad Medicine, Bad Policy," factsheet, Cali-
fornia Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (CARAL) (1998); Johnson v.
Florida, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding child abuse conviction for
mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy).
79. Fetal rights legislation pits women's right to choose against a supposed fetal inter-
est in being born. In the first three months of 1999, 14 states have introduced legislation
that weighs the rights of fetuses over the rights of women. See State of the States REPRO-
DucrIvE FREEDOM NEws, Mar. 1999, at 3.
procreative autonomy."' A new, more relevant and less destructive"1
approach to protect genetic intervention is therefore needed.
As evidenced by the potential impact on women's rights, the con-
cern with protecting genetic intervention is that such protection will
have negative repercussions on existing fundamental rights and social
dynamics. Although "we hope that not all [the children's] sufferings,
and the grief of their families, need be repeated,... we should also
remember the other images and beware lest, in our eagerness to stifle
one source of anguish, we produce other terrible forms of human suf-
fering.' 382 In order to prevent negative outcomes such as cosmetic se-
lection or gender preference, the right that protects disease
prevention must be narrowly drawn and preferably grounded in ex-
isting fundamental liberties. A fundamental right of parents to pro-
tect the bodily dignity of their children fits these requirements.
Although somewhat amorphous, such a right already exists. Living in
the shadows of more explicitly stated parental rights, the right of par-
ents to protect their children from pain and suffering deserves more
prominent recognition.
IV. An Unspoken Liberty: Protecting Children's
Bodily Integrity
[F]or centuries it has been a canon of the common law that parents
speak for their minor children. So deeply embedded in our traditions is
this principle of law that the Constitution itself may compel a State to
protect it.
s3
Care-giver. Provider. Guardian. The function of parents in
American society is undeniable. From decisions surrounding concep-
tion and birth to choices of end-of-life care, parents occupy a critical
decision making role in the lives of their children. The legal roots of
current parenting ideology emphasize the inherent discretion of par-
ents to decide the best interests of their children. 4 In the context of
80. See also Coleman, supra note 9, at 1350-51 (discussing the broad scope and legisla-
tive intent of fetal rights legislation).
81. See also Bruce Nolan, Louisiana Rejects OK on Embryo Tests, NEw ORLEANs
TIMEs-PicAYUNE, Oct. 2, 1994, at Al (discussing the ramifications of labeling in vitro em-
bryos "juridicial person[s]"). Cf. Norton, supra note 4, at 1610 (discussing the "fear that
the use of abortion for a purpose that is ethically more questionable than therapeutic or
nonselective abortion may trigger a greater protest against abortion.").
82. KrrcHER, supra note 36, at 22.
83. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 621 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring).
84. See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 261 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing the general
right to raise children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing par-
ents = liberty to direct the education of their children).
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genetic intervention, the parameters of parental discretion are yet un-
defined. By identifying the established boundaries of parental discre-
tion in situations of abortion, severely disabled newborns, and minor
children's end-of-life care, a clear standard emerges for the protection
of preventative, genetic intervention. In light of the agonizing deci-
sions that some parents must make for their existing children or fe-
tuses, a decision made well in advance of childhood suffering85 seems
a logical extension of already recognized parental discretion.86 Al-
though the concerns regarding overbroad protections are legitimate,
the construction of a narrowly defined right-grounded in existing
fundamental liberties-eliminates the possibility of using genetic in-
tervention for superficial and socially damaging purposes.87
A. Abortion Decisions
Politically speaking, the decision to have an abortion can be one
of the most controversial choices of a woman's life.88 Despite the con-
tentious aspects of the abortion debate, the abortion decision remains,
for the most part, a private one. Although every Supreme Court
abortion decision explicitly preserves the State's authority to regulate
access to post-viability abortion,8 9 before viability, the decision to bear
or beget a child resides solely with the pregnant woman.90 As con-
firmed by the Court, this broad decisional autonomy bears testament
to the capacity of women to decide what is in their own best interest,
as well as in the best interest of their potential children.91 Regardless
of fetal health or the probable health of potential children, pre-viabil-
ity abortion decisions are for women alone to make.92
Irrespective of possible limitations on genetic intervention, post-
viability abortion restrictions regulate parental decision making at the
earliest allowed stage of parenthood. By intervening in women's
abortion decisions, the State removes the presumption that mothers
85. See supra note 42 & infra note 103.
86. See also Sheperd, supra note 38, at 793-808 (discussing author's "attachment the-
ory" as an alternative means of protecting genetic selection).
87. See ROBERTSON, supra note 55, at 150 (discussing the potentially harmful role of
genetic intervention in the commodification of children).
88. See Grimes, supra note 50, at 747 (citing abortion as "the most divisive social issue
of our times.").
89. See discussion supra Part III.
90. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 1377 (discussing the Court's consideration of wo-
men's particular life situations in assessing an unlimited right to pre-viable abortion).
91. See supra notes 41 & 46.
92. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 1377 (discussing the Court's decision to refuse "a
complete ban on abortions.").
who carry viable fetuses will act in their potential children's best inter-
est. Although these restrictions are offensive to broad notions of wo-
men's bodily autonomy, the restrictions highlight an important point
in favor of preventative intervention arguments: the best interests of
potential children are paramount.93 The point is further supported by
the exceptions to most post-viability restrictions that permit women to
abort when the lives or health of their potential children are compro-
mised by either disease or deformity.94 The message is clear. Al-
though the State reserves the authority to prevent post-viability
abortion, the State cedes this authority when a maternal decision to
abort would prevent the suffering or death of a potential child and
thus would protect the best interest of the potential child.9 5 This ra-
tionale lends great support for parental decision making at the embry-
onic level.
The right of mothers, as potential parents, to make prenatal deci-
sions regarding the health and well-being of their unborn children is a
clearly defined right. Considering the extent of pre-viability fetal de-
velopment and the parental discretion allowed in terminating a preg-
nancy at the pre-viable stage, the elimination of possible life at the
genetic level also warrants constitutional protection.96 Although
abortion rights are premised in bodily autonomy arguments, abortion
restrictions are premised on the best interests of potential children. In
deciding the limits of abortion rights, the State must weigh the best
interests of both potential parents and potential children, especially
when the interests of the parties conflict. In the case of genetic inter-
vention for disease prevention, where the best interests of parents and
future children are aligned, the State should have no trouble support-
ing the use of preventative technology. 97 Parental discretion in ge-
93. This is a controversial point. Recognizing the interests of fetal life-at any stage of
development-places women's reproductive fights in a precarious position. The more rec-
ognition of fetal fights, the less discretion women are afforded in the context of abortion
and other procreative decisions.
94. See "Banning Late-term Abortions: Bad Medicine, Bad Policy," Factsheet,
CARAL (1998) (noting that late-term abortions "are generally performed only in the most
severe of circumstances: because the woman's life or health is endangered, or because the
fetus suffers severe abnormalities.").
95. See Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 502 ("Public opinion studies show material support
for genetic screening and abortion of seriously genetically defective fetuses.").
96. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 1379 ("Because a state's interests are slight while the
embryo is not viable, those interests do not override the parental interests, and as bans [on
genetic intervention] would.., unduly burden reproductive decision-making.").
97. See Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 503 ("In general, geneticists support the notion
that the potential life of a fetus, without some minimal functioning nervous system, should
not have a protected fight of life.").
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netic intervention is, therefore, a logical extension of the maternal
discretion inherent in the decisions to terminate pre-viable or ill-fated
pregnancies. 98
B. Life or Death Decisions for Critically 1I Newborns
The birth of critically ill or severely disabled newborns places par-
ents in the unenviable position of deciding the proper course of treat-
ment for their children. Not only do these parents have to confront
the painful reality of their newborns' permanent and life-limiting disa-
bilities, but they must also restructure, or even bury, expectations re-
garding their children's quality of life. After weighing the
possibilities, parents can make one of two choices. By using extraordi-
nary medical efforts,9 9 parents can choose to sustain or attempt to sus-
tain the lives of their infant children. Alternatively, by choosing to
cease nourishment or forego life-saving procedures, parents can de-
cide to end the lives of their newborns.100 Although a right of parents
to end the lives of their critically ill newborns does not explicitly exist,
the presumption that parents will act in the best interest of their chil-
dren, again, gives credence to broad parental discretion.
Although opponents of non-treatment have aimed restrictive leg-
islation at parents who forego sustenance for their critically ill
newborns,10 in most cases, courts have refused to apply the suggested
prohibitions. 02 When applied to the circumstance of severely dis-
abled newborns, judicial support for parental decision making further
suggests a general right of parents to protect the bodily integrity of
98. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 1365 (discussing "'the constitutional choices that
include the right to abort a fetus within the first trimester must also include the right to
submit to a procedure designed to give information about that fetus which can then lead to
a decision to abort."') (internal citations omitted).
99. See HELGA KUHSE & PETER SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LivE? THE PROBLEM
OF HANDICAPPED INFANTs 33 (1985) ("Extraordinary means . . . include all medicines,
treatments and operations which cannot be obtained without excessive expense, pain or
inconvenience, or which, if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit.").
100. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
101. See James Bopp, Jr. & Mary Nimz, A Legal Analysis of the Child Abuse Amend-
ments of 1984, in CO ELLED COMPASSION: GovERmn NT INTERvENioN IN THE TREAT-
MENT OF CRrTCALLY ILL NEWBORNS 74-103 (Arthur L. Caplan et al., eds. 1992)
(discussing the reaction of the Reagan administration to the deaths of Baby Doe and Baby
Jane Doe).
102. See id. at 76 (discussing Bowen v. American Hosp. Assn., 476 U.S. 610 (1986),
where the Supreme Court held that "in situations in which parents withhold consent to
treatment for their disabled child, the child is not 'otherwise qualified' to receive
treatment.").
their children. °3 In allowing parents to decide the fate of suffering
infants, judges again weigh the interests of children, parents and State.
Considering the debilitating effects of severe disability and the cruel
thought of forcing children and parents alike to endure unnecessary
suffering, judicial prerogative tends to agree that the interests of all
three parties are aligned in protecting the bodily dignity of the child.
The discretion afforded parents in the newborn context again
suggests the relevance of disease prevention strategies at earlier stages
of human development. More importantly, the extent of discretion
given to parents of already born infants implies that such a right
should be upheld at the embryonic level, when non-transfer of em-
bryos has far less of a social impact than cessation of infant life.104
C. Minor Children and End-of-Life Decisions
Of all the possible decisions that parents must make, the choice
to forego life support for minor children is the most heart-wrenching.
Unlike parental decisions regarding embryos, fetuses or newborns, life
or death choices concerning children include deep emotions flowing
from established parent-child relationships. Even in cases where chil-
dren have always lacked cognitive ability, the attachment that parents
feel for these children aggravates the immeasurable agony inherent in
affirmative decisions to end life support or refuse life-prolonging
treatment.
For parents who choose to end life support to protect their chil-
dren from either intolerable suffering or a severely degraded quality
of life,' °5 State restrictions on parental discretion augment the pain of
both children and their families. 0 6 Fortunately for parents, [t]he
103. Courts increasingly hear cases dealing with hospitals' refusal to follow parents'
wishes regarding their critically ill newborns. See Julie Gannon Shoop, Parents of Disabled
Child Win Punitive Damages for 'Wrongful Birth,' 34 TRL 16 (1998) (discussing multi-
million dollar verdict for the parents of an infant who was resuscitated against her parents'
wishes). Shoop's article demonstrates judicial support for parental decision making, espe-
cially in cases where the hospital's resuscitation severely compromises the bodily integrity
of the infant. Shoop discusses a case where the resuscitated child-now seven years old-
is "profoundly retarded, suffers from cerebral palsy, and cannot see, walk, talk, roll over,
or feed herself." Id.
104. For a cross-cultural perspective on when infant life becomes valued, see KuiSE &
SINGER, supra note 99, at 98-117 (discussing the role of infanticide in non-Western culture).
105. This Note only considers circumstances where minor children are incapable, due to
the debilitating nature of their disease or disability, of voicing opinions regarding their
future medical treatment.
106. See Ann MacLean Massie, Withdrawal of Treatment for Minors in a Persistent Veg-
etative State: Parents Should Decide, 35 ARiz. L. Rnv. 173, 176 (1993) ("Loving parents
may be unable to bring closure to a nightmare that precludes the possibility of even the
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number of court cAses involving children is much smaller than that
concerning adult patients, which is probably explained by the lesser
uncertainty about the authority of parents to make such decisions for
their minor children ... ."107 Although formal prohibitions suppos-
edly apply to end-of-life decisions for children, many courts, physi-
cians and ethics committees recognize the eminent capacity of parents
to decide what is in the best interests of their suffering children.'08
The discretion provided to parents in deciding appropriate end-
of-life care for their children provides strong support for protecting
disease prevention strategies at the embryonic level. By locating and
eliminating inevitable suffering, genetic screening gives parents the
tools to avoid agonizing end-of-life decisions and, more importantly,
the means to prevent the unnecessary pain and discomfort of their
children.'0 9 In the context of disease and illness, parental decision
making is difficult at any stage of a child's-or potential child's-life.
The decision to forego implantation of diseased embryos, however,
cannot compare to the anguish experienced by parents who are forced
to decide the life or death of their existing children. Given the discre-
tion in the latter context, as well as the non-recognition of embryonic
rights,110 protection of disease prevention technology seems a logical
and compassionate extension of parental decision making.1"
D. Result of the Analogies
Parental decision making, at all stages of children's development,
is a discretion that has traditionally been afforded great protection.
normal grieving process facing those who lose a child-at least, not without resort to the
time-consuming and costly legal procedures that only add to an already overwhelming
emotional burden.").
107. Id. at 218 note 22 (internal citation omitted).
108. See id. at 218 n.120 (quoting In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984): "[D]ecisions of this character have traditionally been made within the privacy of the
family relationship based on competent medical advice and consultation by the family with
their religious advisors, if that be their persuasion.").
109. See also Lawrence 0. Gostin, Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom: From
Quinlan to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco-A Brief History and Analysis of Constituional
Protection of the 'Right to Die,' JAMA, Nov. 12, 1997, at 1523 (noting that "thoughtful
opinion in medicine and ethics holds that physicians have a duty to honor patients' wishes,
provide comfort, and relieve suffering."). This Note argues that this physician duty extends
to future children, whether they are fetuses or embryos.
110. See KrrcHER, supra note 36, at 229 ("When a presentient fetus dies, either natu-
rally or through human intervention, there is no violation of rights or interests because
there is bearer of rights .... ).
111. Cf. Gostin, supra note 109, at 1523 (discussing an unstated constitutional right to
die with dignity). This Note argues that this right extends to disease-affected embryos and
fetuses.
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Although not explicitly cited in support of parental decisions regard-
ing abortion, critically ill newborns, and minor children's end-of-life
care, the right of parents to protect their children's-or potential chil-
dren's-bodily integrity underlies the judicial and medical endorse-
ment of parental discretion in those contexts. The right applies
equally to existing and future children, thereby protecting decision
making at the embryonic level.112 Unlike the limits on reproductive
rights, the right to protect children's bodily dignity is more thoroughly
grounded in fundamental rights doctrine and, therefore, provides a
more trustworthy means of protecting parental discretion in making
difficult procreative choices."3
V. An Exclusive Right: Alienating Superficial Interventions
We should be worried about the future and where this might take us.
The whole definition of normal could well be changed. The issue be-
comes not the ability of the child to be happy but rather our ability to be
happy with the child."4
The far reaching and potentially discriminatory consequences of
embryonic intervention compel a thorough examination of the mo-
tives underlying the use of genetic technology. Already "many as-
pects of appearance and personality are under fairly simple genetic
control,"" 5 suggesting that substantial interest exists to further cos-
metic, personality, and gender selection. Shallow notions of social ac-
ceptability define who is attractive, desirable, and respected in human
society and, subsequently, devalue the lives of people who do not fit
the socially constructed "norm." Unlike genetic intervention to pre-
vent suffering and disease, cosmetic selection is equivalent to the hor-
rors of past human disasters," 6 such as the Holocaust 17 and the
institutionalization of American slavery. The championing of value-
112. See also Norton, supra note 4, at 1599 (discussing the physical and psychological
impact of discarding disease-affected embryos versus aborting disease-affected fetuses).
113. See also Coleman, supra note 9, at 1380 (discussing parents' interests in genetic
screening outweighing state interests due to screening's "close link" to procreative
freedom).
114. Geoffrey Cowley et al., Made to Order Babies, NE-WSWEEK, Spring 1991, at 94
(quoting George Annas).
115. Id.
116. See Weinberg, supra note 12, at 1767 (discussing past ramifications of genetic
discrimination).
117. See Norton, supra note 4, at 1612-13 (discussing the role of genetic differences in
the Holocaust).
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laden intervention proposes, in effect, a return to eugenicism 118 and
the promulgation of intolerance. If unchecked, the use of superficial
selection criteria'1 9 will effectuate a caste system, where the disparity
between the wealthy and the poor, 2 ° the accepted and the undesir-
able, will further stratify society and undermine the fundamental
rights of all people. The decision to use technology to advance such
self-interested goals affronts fundamental guarantees of equality and
individual worth and is in no way supported by either American legal
tradition or this paper's proposed constitutional standard.
12'
As genetic technology advances, appropriate regulations will
need to address the divergent purposes of intervention. By supporting
the use of disease screening technology, regulation can curb needless
childhood suffering and, subsequently, reduce the chances of familial
tragedy. Alternatively, by supporting broad interventions, regardless
of the intervention's purpose, regulation can instigate social stratifica-
tion and oppression. Keeping the best interests of children and soci-
ety in mind, the decision to forego sweeping acceptance of genetic
intervention is obvious. The challenge, therefore, lies in creating a
protection that excludes offensive superficial intervention, but safe-
guards the important function of disease prevention. The answer lies
in the application of the parental right, articulated above, to protect
the bodily integrity of children.
Although the proposed right safeguards parental discretion, the
motivating purpose of the right is the protection of children's health
and well-being. 22 As exemplified by current protections for parental
decisions in children's end-of-life care, application of a right of paren-
tal discretion focuses on life and death decisions regarding children.
The current application draws a bright line between critical parental
decisions that safeguard their children from suffering or bodily indig-
nity and superficial parental desires to enhance the appearances of
118. See Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 501 ("Eugenics has several definitions, including
'good in birth' and 'a social movement to improve the human species through the use of
technology."'). See also id. at 501-03 (discussing the history of eugenics in the United
States).
119. In defining superficial selection criteria, one doctor notes that occasionally poten-
tial parents "have a sort of new-car mentality... [The baby's] got to be perfect, and if it
isn't you take it back to the lot and get a new one." Cowley, supra note 114, at 94.
120. The high cost of genetic engineering excludes the poor from available genetic in-
tervention techniques. See also infra note 127.
121. See also Norton, supra note 4, at 1603-10 (discussing the moral objections to cos-
metic selection).
122. See also Sheperd, supra note 38, at 799 (noting that for genetic screening decisions
"it is generally best for children, or children-to-be, for parents to make these decisions.").
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their children.123 The purpose of the intervention is, therefore, taken
into account when analyzing which parental choices fall within the
protected right.
Some might argue that superficial selection-by eliminating obes-
ity or increasing intelligence-will improve potential children's quality
of life and, thus, fall into the category of protecting bodily integrity.
The argument fails for two reasons. First, the parental protection of
children's bodily integrity already exists and, as currently applied,
does not extend beyond life or death decisions for children. And sec-
ond, the true motivation for trivial intervention is not the health of
children, but rather the desire to manufacture offspring in order to
ensure parental acceptance. 124 This purpose offends traditional no-
tions of unconditional parental love, as well as encourages society to
create value systems based on physical appearance. Furthermore,
equating the trivial results of cosmetic selection with critical decisions
that prevent human pain and suffering degrades the role of parents as
the protectors of children.
Outlined in the end-of-life choices regarding children, the param-
eters of parental discretion are clearly limited to decisions based on
children's health, well-being, and bodily integrity. Superficial inter-
ventions do not fall within the boundaries of the right's protection.
Disease prevention, however, is clearly within the "best interests" dis-
cretion traditionally afforded to American parents. Application of the
parental discretion standard, therefore, differentiates between genetic
intervention for superficial selection and genetic intervention for dis-
ease prevention. In light of future regulation of genetic technology,
the difference is of utmost significance. Grounded in decades of sup-
port for fundamental parental rights, parental discretion in protecting
children's bodily integrity will inevitably safeguard the use of disease
prevention against regulation. Thus, while cosmetic selection awaits
intense scrutinization and ethical validation, a clear articulation of the
parental discretion right preserves the best interests-in the context of
disease prevention-of both parents and children.
123. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 1381 ("The compelling state interest appears to
override parents' interests when nontherapeutic genetic screening is done, such as screen-
ing for certain sex or hair color traits.").
124. See id. at 1381-82 (discussing the parameters of government regulation of embryos
and genetic intervention).
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VI. Compassion v. Discrimination: A Note
on Differentiation
There will always be people who have disabilities that are not detected
by this screening. Their disability could be acquired later in life because
of accident or illness. What happens to them if we declare disabled
fetuses and embryos undesirable?*1
Although the relatively high costs126 of genetic intervention keep
the correlating technology-for the time being-in the hands of the
wealthy,127 the impact of disease screening is felt throughout soci-
ety. 2 The choice to forego pregnancies that will result in disability
implies, on some level, a social intolerance of physical difference. 29
For some disabled people, the "screening out" process screams of dis-
crimination and devaluation."' At first glance, the argument seems
plausible: the choice to abandon diseased embryos expresses an intol-
erance, aversion or disdain for disabled life. 31 The argument, how-
ever, is over-simplified and-in many ways-as "discriminatory" as
the genetic choices that the argument so vehemently denounces.
The capacity of some disabled opponents to articulate concerns
regarding genetic screening demonstrates the wide range of disability
that disease can cause. There are many disabled people who, al-
though physically impaired, actively think, reason, aspire, achieve, and
thrive. For these individuals, life is a valuable, precious commodity
and should not be denied to them. On the other hand, there are many
125. Moysa, supra note 14, at A4 (quoting a lawyer for the Canadian Disability Rights
Council).
126. See Cell Testing Finds Abnormality Early, SAN DiEGo UNIoN-TRmUNE, Oct. 21,
1992, at E4 (citing the expense of disease prevention screening).
127. See Norton, supra note 4, at 1597-99 (discussing the deterrent effect of high genetic
screening costs).
128. See id. at 1586-88 (discussing past discrimination based on genetic composition of
individuals, including the eugenics movement, Supreme Court decisions, and discrimina-
tion in the armed forces).
129. See Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 499 ("Developments in genetic engineering may
push less fortunate individuals to the sidelines of society by elevating the definition of
'normal' and 'acceptable."').
130. See KrrcHER, supra note 36, at 221-22 ("Men and women who have overcome
hereditary disabilities ... believe that the use of abortion as a tool degrades the value of
life, even when it is employed by those who are otherwise well intentioned and far seeing.
Troubled by current practices of annioscentesis and selective abortion, and foreseeing a
proliferation of prenatal tests, they are daunted by the prospect of a world in which life
becomes a commodity, something to be stamped with approval before birth or labeled
'defective' and discarded.").
131. See Esfandiary, supra note 1, at 499 ("As society focuses on improving the human
race, compassion for the disabled may decrease to traumatic levels affording less apprecia-
tion for differences between individuals.").
disabled people who have no cognitive ability, who do not understand
nor appreciate the life around them, who know only pain. For these
individuals, pre-implantation parental discretion spares them the bod-
ily indignity that life inevitably holds. By assuming that all disabled
people share an appreciation for human life, disabled opponents of
genetic intervention assume one static definition of disability. Reality
proves that, in the worst circumstances, life brings some disabled chil-
dren only pain, hopelessness, and bodily degradation.'32 Unlike dis-
crimination, disease prevention's benevolent purpose encourages
cognitive, compassionate people, whether physically disabled or unde-
niably healthy, to recognize the humanity inherent in the prevention
of needless suffering.
This Note does not suggest that disabilities should be weighed by
degree or disparity of affliction. This Note does, however, recognize
the right of parents to assess the future of their potential children and
to decide, according to their own belief systems, what disabilities will
adversely affect the best interests of their offspring.'33 Given the dis-
cretion afforded parents in treatment decisions regarding already-
born disabled children, the use of preventative non-implantation tech-
niques is no less an act of protecting bodily integrity than refusing
sustenance for a critically ill newborn or opting to terminate life sup-
port for a suffering child. The decision to forego implantation of dis-
eased embryos and, thus, forego an ill-fated pregnancy does not
equate affirmative discrimination against disabled people. Disease
prevention, rather, speaks to a well-defined parental right to protect
children from pain and suffering, using whatever means are legally
available. Any decision to forego human life will inevitably draw ac-
cusations of discrimination and intolerance. For the time being, how-
ever, decisions regarding pre-viable life remain in the hands and
consciences of potential parents. Instead of stirring public accusations
of discrimination, decisions to use disease prevention technology
should, and do, fall within the protected parameters of private, in-
terfamilial discussion and decision making.
132. See supra note 103.
133. Although this note supports fairly unrestrained parental discretion in disease pre-
vention decisions, this note also recognizes the need for regulation to prevent the abuse of
disease prevention technology. Future regulation within the realm of preventative proce-
dures, however, will not be addressed in this Note.
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VII. Criticism: Conservatives and Feminists Take Aim
The silence of the law on many areas of individual choice reflects
the value this country places on pluralism. Nowhere is the need for
freedom to pursue divergent conceptions of the good more deeply felt
than in decisions concerning reproduction.
134
The potential abuse of genetic technology 135 is a legitimate con-
cern for disabled individuals and their advocates. 36 In the event of
increased support for genetic intervention, the discrimination con-
cerns must be adequately addressed by specific judicial, legislative, or
regulatory language. The legitimate concerns of disability discrimina-
tion can be successfully mitigated by a compassionate and succinct ap-
proach to regulating disease prevention. 37 There are, however, more
potent political forces that could conceivably derail efforts to protect
parental decision making.' 38 This Note specifically recognizes estab-
lished conservative 39 and feminist 40 ideologies as possible threats to
the proposed parental right to safeguard the bodily integrity of future
children.
When parents decide to use disease prevention technology, the
subsequent conception of a healthy embryo almost invariably guaran-
tees the implantation and gestation of the screened embryo. The
"chosen" embryo is therefore labeled a potential life, a life that-
given the massive reproductive effort of the parents involved-is very
much a wanted life. 4 ' The arbitrary nature of assigning life status to
only healthy embryos is, at first glance, problematic. In light of recent
attempts by political conservatives to protect all potential life,' 42 some
critics of disease prevention technology might argue that merely label-
ing a fertilized ovum a "defective embryo" does not erase the capacity
for life inherent in the embryo. Unfortunately, this so-called protec-
134. Davis, supra note 10, at 4-5 (internal citations omitted).
135. See discussion supra Part V.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. "Parental decision making" refers to parental autonomy in deciding to use disease
prevention techniques.
139. This Note addresses only one facet of the broad-and arguably diverse--conserva-
tive agenda: the "pro-life" stance.
140. This Note recognizes that feminists have diverse opinions regarding abortion. For
example, some feminists believe that fetal life is not yet human life. Other feminists be-
lieve that fetal life is human life, but this life is trumped by maternal choice and autonomy.
For the purposes of this Note, I define the feminist position as a general pro-choice
conviction.
141. See discussion supra Part II.
142. See supra notes 78-79.
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tion of human life fails to consider the compassion underlying parents'
decisions to prevent the suffering of their potential children.
In the recent past, conservative efforts have resulted in laws that
value fetal life over maternal decision making and maternal health. 43
Whether at the state' 44 or federal'45 level, the attack on women's right
to choose abortion, even at the previable stage, 46 does not lend much
support to a parental right to discard disease-affected embryos. Ironi-
cally, the arguments made in favor of protecting potential life parallel
the arguments made by parents desperate to protect the bodily integ-
rity of their future children. In sum, parents who use disease screen-
ing and anti-abortion activists share a common goal: protection of the
unborn. In the case of parental use of disease screening, however,
protection of unborn children-embryos included-is defined more
broadly. Parents who choose to assess the genetic health of their po-
tential offspring ensure the birth of the selected embryo, as well as the
health and well-being of their future children. In this sense, parents
who utilize disease screening actually go beyond the conservative goal
of protecting fetal interests. 147 The parents who choose disease pre-
vention protect fetal interests, as well as the interests of the children
that the embryos and fetuses will inevitably become.
Although the broad construction of fetal protection refutes con-
servative criticism, this Note's mention of fetal interests will invariably
offend feminist groups determined to keep fetal language out of the
abortion debate. 4 8 The parental right to protect the bodily integrity
of future children, however, also withstands feminist critique. The pa-
rental right to use disease prevention 49 is not a mandate. Rather the
right to use disease screening is a negative right against public or pri-
vate interference.Y0 In the context of disease screening, fetal interests
are not a premise on which the parental right depends. Instead, fetal
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See STAGGENBORG, supra note 56, at 81-83 (discussing the Hyde Amendment-a
federal law that banned Medicaid spending for abortion-and the subsequent expansion of
the anti-choice movement).
146. Many of the late-term abortion bans include language that, if construed broadly,
would prohibit abortion at any stage. See supra notes 78-79.
147. This Note attempts to reconcile conservative viewpoints with parental rights in the
context of disease screening. This Note does not attempt to reconcile the issues that con-
servative observers might have with abortion and end-of-life care for children with the
more 'liberal' stance taken in this Note. See supra text Part IV.
148. See supra notes 78-79.
149. The right to protect the bodily integrity of future children encompasses the right to
use disease prevention. See discussion supra Part IV.
150. See ROBERTSON, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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interests arise as a result of a parental choice to protect those inter-
ests. The parental choice151 to carry the screened embryo to term is
central to the right to protect the bodily integrity of future children.
The proposed right, therefore, relies on the same constitutional rights
as those protected by pro-choice feminists.'52
Surprisingly, the parental right to protect potential children si-
multaneously appeases the concerns of conservatives and feminists.
By protecting, in the most compassionate sense, the lives of potential
children, the proposed right aligns with conservative goals. By pro-
tecting, and even broadening, parental decision making regarding re-
production, the proposed right in no way endangers feminist
conceptions of choice. In the context of genetic screening, where the
interests of parents and potential children are fundamentally aligned,
criticisms of a parental right to protect future children need more than
political agendas to survive refutation.
VIII. Conclusion: Children First
When a child is conceived, a dream is born. The dream imagines a
healthy, strong, and clever child, who with confidence and success, ful-
fills a desire to bear a child. That vision turns into a nightmare when
the doctor says there are some problems. What could the problems
be?1
53
As genetic and reproductive technology advance, the boundaries
of parental decision making will radically expand, challenging society
to redefine traditional notions of reproduction and parenthood. For
those parents whose children will inevitably experience debilitating
disease, genetic intervention offers a compassionate means of prevent-
ing childhood suffering. The rapid augmentation in procreative abil-
ity, however, also creates the possibility of human engineering and
abuse of genetic technology. The challenge, therefore, becomes devis-
ing a safeguard for disease prevention that excludes offensive and so-
cially destructive genetic interventions. Fortunately for many parents
and children, the mechanism for exclusively protecting disease pre-
vention technology already exists.
151. This Note also advocates the broad right of pregnant women to abort for reasons
other than fetal deformity. The topic of abortion, however, is not specifically addressed in
this Note.
152. See supra notes 23 & 45.
153. Karen Hinderliter, Death of a Dream, EXCEmONAL PARENT, Jan./Feb. 1988, at
48.
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American legal tradition has long recognized the right of parents
to protect the bodily integrity of their children. The right manifests in
the context of parental discretion in children's end-of-life care and in-
herently recognizes the capacity of parents to decide the best interests
of their children. The right logically extends into the embryonic
realm, compassionately preventing both the onset of childhood suffer-
ing, as well as the agonizing life or death decisions that some parents
must make for their beloved children. The advent of the genetic
revolution bestows parents with the extraordinary means to protect
their children's bodily dignity at all stages of human development.
The right of parents to prevent the needless suffering of their children
is thoroughly grounded in traditional parental protections and de-
serves more prominent recognition as an effective and admirable way
of safeguarding the best interests of both parents and their potential
children.
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